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Abstract—In this paper, based on a thorough analysis of the
state of the art, we point out a missing solution for embedded
devices to secure the syndrome computation. We show that this
weakness can open the door to a side-channel attack targeting
the secret permutation. Indeed, brute-force attack iterations are
dramatically decreased when the secret permutation is recovered.
We demonstrate the feasibility of this attack against the McEliece
cryptosystem implemented on an ARM Cortex-M3 microproces-
sor using Goppa codes. We explain how to recover the secret
permutation on a toy example. Finally, we propose a promising
countermeasure, which can be implemented in embedded devices
to prevent this attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
The code-based cryptosystems are very attractive because
of their robustness regarding attacks based on the use of
quantum computers. The first code-based cryptosystem was
proposed by R. McEliece in 1978 [1]. However, it appeared
that the code-based cryptosystems are as vulnerable to side
channel attacks (SCA) proposed by Kocher in 1996 [2] as other
cryptosystems. The first known SCA against the McEliece
public-key cryptosystem (PKC) appeared in 2008 [3].
Since the first published attack, several other vulnerabilities
were discovered [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12],
[13]. In this paper, we propose a new countermeasure against
a variant of the attack described in [6]. In our attack, we
target a straightforward C implementation of the syndrome
computation on the ARM Cortex-M3 microprocessor [14]. We
explain on a toy example using simple power analysis (SPA)
and chosen ciphertext attack (CCA) that the secret permutation
matrix can be completely recovered.
This paper is organized as follows. We give backgrounds
on Goppa codes and the McEliece cryptosystem in Section II
to fix notations. Then we briefly explain the state of the art in
Section III. We detail our proposal, give the general idea and
provide a toy example of our attack in Section IV. Finally we
conclude this paper in Section V.
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
A. Goppa codes
Goppa codes represent a large class of linear error-
correcting codes proposed in 1970 [15], [16]. However, our
interest is focused exclusively on irreducible binary Goppa
codes that are commonly used in cryptography. For the
sake of simplicity, we will call them simply Goppa codes.
Given a monic irreducible polynomial g(x) over F2m [x] with
deg(g) = t and a set L = {α1, α2, .., αn} representing a
subset of F2m such that g(αi) 6= 0, the Goppa code is defined
as:
Γ(L, g) = {C ∈ Fn2 | SC(x) ≡ 0 mod g(x)}.
We call a polynomial associated to C ∈ Fn2 the syndrome
polynomial:
SC(x) =
n∑
i=1
Ci
x⊕αi .
For decoding a binary Goppa codeword containing errors,
one commonly adopted solution is to use the so-called Patter-
son’s algorithm [17]. We will focus on the first step of this
algorithm consisting in computing a product of a parity-check
matrix of the Goppa code denoted H and the codeword with
less than or equal to t errors denoted C, i.e. S = CHT . The
result of this operation is called the syndrome and it can be
viewed as a polynomial as SC(x) = [xt−1, . . . , x, 1]S.
B. The McEliece cryptosystem
The McEliece PKC using Goppa codes [1] is performed
using three operations: the key generation, plaintext encryption
and ciphertext decryption.
The key generation consists in the determination of the
Goppa code according to the definition given in Section II-A.
As the Goppa code is linear, it can be generated by a so-called
k×n generator matrix denoted G. We randomly choose a non-
singular k × k matrix S and a n × n permutation matrix P .
We compute the public k × n generator matrix as G˜ = SGP .
The key generation procedure outputs the secret key sk =
(Γ(L, g),S,P) and the public key pk = (n, t, G˜).
During the plaintext encryption, the message M is en-
crypted using the public generator matrix. This operation can
be expressed as C = M G˜. Next, an error vector E of length n
and weight t is randomly selected and added to the codeword,
giving the ciphertext C˜ = C ⊕ E.
During the decryption of the ciphertext C˜, the product
C˜P−1 must first be computed giving a codeword containing
an error, i.e. MSG ⊕EP−1. Then, a decoding algorithm (the
Patterson’s algorithm in our case) must be applied on the
obtained secret code. The attack described in Section IV targets
this phase of the ciphertext decryption. The obtained MSG is
multiplied by G−1r on the right side, such that GG−1r = Ik is
the k × k identity matrix, in order to find M˜ = MS. Finally
we compute M = M˜S−1 to recover the plaintext.
III. EXISTING SIDE CHANNEL ATTACKS
Several side channel attacks against the McEliece PKC
were published recently. Most of attacks target the Patterson’s
decoding algorithm and exploit different weaknesses. The most
common are timing attacks aiming either the message [3], [4],
[8] or the private key recovery [5], [11]. Some fault injection
attacks are also known, e.g. that published in [7], based on two
variants of Goppa codes. A combined timing and fault injection
attack targeting the message recovery was proposed in [18].
Finally, the attacks using SPA like those published in [6], [9]
or [13] (for another type of codes) or attacks using differential
power analysis (DPA) [12] (again, for different type of codes)
tend to recover the private key.
In this paper, we focus on the kind of power analysis
attacks proposed in [6]. Based on this principle, we implement
an attack against the syndrome computation. Next, we propose
a countermeasure featuring a linear computational complexity,
which uses similar idea to that published in [3, Algorithm
3]. However, contrary to our solution, this countermeasure
is focused on another type of attack and it has a quadratic
computational complexity.
Four implementation profiles were introduced in the pa-
per [6]. In profile I, rows of the parity-check matrix are
computed as they are needed. Profile II uses precomputed
parity-check matrix. Profiles III and IV omit multiplication
with permutation matrix in the first step of the decryption.
In profile III, syndrome is directly computed from permuted
support. Profile IV uses precomputed and permuted parity-
check matrix. Profile I is favorable for embedded devices due
to low memory requirements. Our countermeasure can be used
for profiles I and II (profile I only if all computations are
constant in time). For testing purposes, we use profile II due
to simplified measurements. If profiles III and IV are used
than the SPA attack and our countermeasure are not applicable
because the permutation matrix is merged with the parity-
check matrix or with the support L.
IV. OUR PROPOSAL
We developed our idea from [6] where the SPA attack on
the permutation matrix was realized. We proposed that this
attack can be avoided by changing algorithm of matrix multi-
plication. Firstly, we performed the attack on a toy example.
After, we modified the algorithm to secure the multiplication.
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Fig. 1. Figure a) shows 25,000 samples of measured power consumption
of ARM Cortex-M3 during matrices multiplication. Figure b) represents
correlation trace which was obtained by computing correlation coefficient
between⊕ instruction pattern and sliding window of currently measured power
trace. As we can see, we can locate⊕ operation around 14,000th sample where
the coefficient almost equal to 1. In straightforward implementation, we can
deduce permutation matrix P from positions of ⊕ instruction (from syndrome
computation) in measured traces.
A. Toy example
Straightforward implementation of permutation and parity-
check matrices multiplication was developed for ARM Cortex-
M3 microcontroller. We chose length of the ciphertext n = 8
bits as a first approach. Afterwards, a power consumption
measurements and SPA attack was performed on the imple-
mentation (Fig. 1). We managed to recover permutation matrix
which was stored in Flash memory of the microcontroller with
100% success rate. Process of recovering P matrix is depicted
in Fig. 2.
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Fig. 2. In each measurement we sent all possible 8-bit ciphertexts with
Hamming weight equal to 1. In power consumption traces the ⊕ pattern
appears in different times depending on input ciphertext. By sorting positions
of the ⊕ pattern appearences we can extract P matrix.
B. Countermeasure
For our toy example we propose algorithm which can
avoid the SPA attack. The basic principle is to avoid branch
statements and data dependent running time. We provide
example of unsecure and secure syndrome computations:
for(i=0; i<DIM_N; i++) // STRAIGHTFORWARD s = H*cp
if ((cp>>i)&0x01) sˆ=H[DIM_N-1-i];
//------------------------------------------------
for(i=0; i<DIM_N; i++) // SECURE s = H*cp
sˆ=H[DIM_N-1-i]*((cp>>i)&0x01);
where s is computed syndrome, DIM N is equal to 8, cp is
8-bit long permuted ciphertext and H is parity-check matrix.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we managed to perform SPA attack on the
toy example which targets the secret permutation matrix in the
McEliece cryptosystem on a microcontroller implementation.
We also proposed coutermeasure which can efficiently avoid
the SPA and timing analysis attacks.
In future research, we will apply the same principles for
full range McEliece algorithm with n = 1024 and n = 2048
bits. Afterwards, we will examine other possible attacks on
our implementation of permutation and parity-check matrices
multiplications.
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